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Not surprisingly, the outcome of the Bush-Gore vote tally has prompted calls for the reform or abolition of the Electoral College. Such calls are not new; there have been more constitutional amendments introduced in Congress for alteration or abolition of the Electoral College than on any other subject.

But much of the criticism of the Electoral College is inaccurate, and fails to take account of the structural advantages offered by such a voting mechanism.    

There are two distinct objections to the Electoral College system. First is the specter of "faithless electors." All but two states use a winner-take-all system in which a slate of electors is pledged to vote for the candidate of the party that has selected them. The Constitution, however, does not impose any obligation on electors to keep their pledges. Thus, some fear that in a close election like this one, one or a handful of renegade electors could conceivably thwart the will of 100 million voters by abstaining or switching ranks. But because electors are selected by the parties for their ironclad loyalty, the issue of "faithless electors" is basically hypothetical.

The second objection, however, is anything but hypothetical: Because of the vagaries of the Electoral College system, it is possible for a candidate to obtain the most popular votes nationwide but lose the election. This is the objection that is being voiced most loudly now, but it is a more spurious objection.

A strict majoritarianism has never been the only criterion in our constitutional structure. The Electoral College system offers other benefits that may more than balance the risk of an occasional anomaly; it, for example, requires a presidential candidate to campaign in many regions to gain a semblance of national support. Were the election strictly a national vote-getting contest, candidates might only work the high-population areas where their efforts would have the most bang for the buck.

And, more by coincidence than by design, the Electoral College and the two-party system seem to be made for each other. The Electoral College system places severe restraints on the leverage of third-party candidates, who rarely can compete for electoral votes. Thus, in a national popular vote, the threat of a Ralph Nader to the major candidates would be more salient, and might have led to pre-election concessions to him. Even this is ambiguous: A large number of Nader's votes came from those who thought their states were safe for Gore. Without the electoral system, those voters might have cast their ballots for Gore.

These structural consequences of the political system probably outweigh the risk of an occasional situation such as we now face. Our constitutional system is studded with important, and basically wholesome, qualifications of sheer majoritarianism. The roles of the Senate and of judicial review in our republican form of government are only the best-known examples. Those who lament the frustration of the "one person, one vote" principle by this situation would do well to consider that other political realities - such as the vagaries of legislative apportionment - do far more to frustrate that principle than does the Electoral College. The preoccupations of the moment do not justify a constitutional overhaul.

Clyde Spillenger is a professor of law. This op-ed was adapted from one that ran Nov. 10 in the Los Angeles Times. For the complete text, go to www.law.ucla.edu.