BY PETER KATONA
There are many excellent reasons both for and
against going to war with Iraq. Among these, the most important
fact is that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction, particularly
bioweapons, and would be willing to use them or sell them to
others. This creates a very dangerous precedent for current
and future dictators and terrorist groups.
Historically, the Iraqi regime has a well- documented
history of WMDs. Iraq started its offensive bioweapons program
in the mid-1970s. Unwittingly, the United States supplied Iraq
with seed stocks for bioweapons until 1989. Nonetheless, in
1990 Iraq was still able to buy 40 top-of-the-line “aerosol
generators” from an Italian company. Each was capable
of dispersing 800 gallons of bio or chemical agent per hour.
Not only has Iraq developed WMDs, it has also
put them to use. In the 1980s, Iraq used chemical weapons against
Iran and the Kurds. Iraq’s potential to develop nuclear
weapons was thwarted when Israel bombed its nuclear power plant
in 1981. By 1991, Iraq’s influence in the region stemmed
from its ability to bully its neighbors. To the Iraqis, the
benefits of keeping their WMD programs alive were substantial,
even at the risk of losing billions of dollars of oil revenues.
Biological agents were their nuclear bomb. Even if they were
never used, the rumor of their existence could make little nations
take note and might give Western powers reason to pause.
After the first Persian Gulf War, weapons inspectors
found 19,000 liters of botulinum toxin, 2,200 liters of aflatoxin
and 8,500 liters of anthrax in Iraq’s arsenal. The Iraqis
acknowledged filling 25 missiles and 157 bombs with anthrax
and botulism toxin. They had 13 SCUDS loaded with botulism toxin,
10 with anthrax spores and two with aflatoxin. They also had
100 bombs loaded with botulism toxin, 50 with anthrax spores
and 16 with aflatoxin, plus at least one remote-control MiG-21
with a 500-gallon sprayer.
So why weren’t these weapons used during
the Persian Gulf War? There are several reasons. The United
States made it clear that if used, Baghdad would be “returned
to the Middle Ages.” There was a fear that Israel would
retaliate with nuclear weapons. The chain of command was broken
early in the war so Saddam Hussein possibly couldn’t give
the order to use them. Lastly, they could contaminate their
own people.
Between 1991 and 1998, when the last inspectors
left, more than 10,000 warheads adapted for chemical and biological
use were destroyed, yet thousands more are still unaccounted
for. Baghdad claimed to have destroyed them but never provided
proof.
Despite six years of the most aggressive inspection
in arms-control history, the fate of more than 150 Iraqi bombs
and warheads, as well as a dozen special nozzles to spray these
germs from helicopters, has remained unknown. A veteran intelligence
officer, commenting on Iraqi weapons inspections, said, “Absence
of evidence is not evidence of absence.”
Despite the dire consequences and the reluctance
of others to act, the United States has to make a stand against
these destructive weapons. While the reasons may seem uncertain,
we can’t deny that these weapons pose a threat to the
stability of the entire world.
Katona is assistant professor of clinical
medicine in the Department of Medicine.
