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Stemming the tide of nuclear proliferation

BY ALBERT CARNESALE

Since Sept. 11, 2001, Americans have focused on securing our homeland against terrorism. But not all forms of terrorist threats are equal. The gravest by far is that posed by the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which comprise nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. And of these, only nuclear weapons threaten the very survival of our nation. Accordingly, highest priority should be given to preventing the further spread of nuclear-weapons capabilities.

The current global distribution of nuclear weapons merits both cautious optimism and warranted concern. On the positive side, the past three decades have brought little change in the number of countries having nuclear weapons. In 1974, there were five “declared” nuclear-weapons states: the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France and China. Israel and South Africa probably also had nuclear arsenals at that time, and India tested a nuclear-explosive device that very year.

The ensuing 30 years have seen the addition of Pakistan and probably North Korea to the list, and the subtraction of South Africa, which rolled back its nuclear program. Thus, over the past three decades, the number of countries on the nuclear list has grown by only one, from eight to nine. Iran appears to have forestalled its efforts to become number 10.

Another source of optimism is that production of nuclear weapons is neither easy nor quick. Even though nuclear technology has been around since the 1940s, it remains difficult and time-consuming to produce the essential weapons-grade plutonium or highly enriched uranium.

There are also grounds for concern. The collapse of the Soviet Union caused “instant proliferation.” Where there had been one nuclear-weapons state, the Soviet Union, there were suddenly four: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Although it is believed that all of their nuclear weapons have been consolidated on Russian territory, there remains some doubt as to whether “all” really means all, and as to whether there remain outside of Russia substantial quantities of weapons-grade materials. Nor are we confident that the weapons and materials within Russia are adequately protected against theft or illicit purchase: The problem of “loose nukes” continues to merit our attention. Finally, economic dislocation in Russia has forced thousands of highly trained nuclear scientists and engineers onto the job market, and they may find willing employers among nations and organizations seeking to acquire or produce nuclear weapons.

Nonstate actors, such as Al Qaeda and some other terrorist groups, have substantial resources, global reach and, it appears, incentives to strike at Western interests on a massive scale. It is unlikely that such groups could produce nuclear weapons on their own. The greater danger is that they might get them from a state sponsor or might buy or steal them. And there is reason to believe that if a terrorist group like Al Qaeda got nuclear weapons, it would use them.

All of these factors — incentives to acquire and use nuclear weapons, ample financial resources, inadequately secured nuclear weapons and materials, and a pool of highly trained specialists willing to sell their expertise — contribute to the challenge of stemming nuclear proliferation to states and terrorist organizations. Yet it is a challenge that must be met if our nation is to be secure. At present, U.S. nonproliferation policy must focus on Russia (as a potential source of loose nukes), North Korea, Iran and nonstate groups, principally Al Qaeda.

Russia has thousands of nuclear weapons, thousands of tons of weapons-grade materials and thousands of nuclear engineers and scientists. Nightmarish stories of missing “suitcase bombs,” unlocked or unguarded storage facilities, black marketeering, etc., abound. Whether or not any of these tales is true, it is in Russia’s interest, and ours, to redouble efforts to secure those stockpiles and to prevent the leakage of nuclear experts and expertise.

North Korea probably has enough plutonium to make up to about 10 weapons, and may already have made them. In addition, its plutonium-production rate is sufficient to produce another bomb each year. Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea pledged to freeze its nuclear-weapons activities and, in return, the United States, South Korea and Japan were to provide economic aid in the form of fuel oil and proliferation-resistant nuclear-power plants. The 1994 accord did not hold, with all sides pointing fingers at each other. North Korea “set aside” the Agreed Framework and subsequently withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. (The treaty provides a measure of transparency, including inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, to guard against the diversion of peaceful nuclear technologies and materials to military uses. Among the nations in the world, only India, Pakistan, Israel, and now North Korea, are not parties.)

Negotiations involving the parties to the 1994 Agreed Framework, plus China, have been in on-again/off-again mode for the past couple of years. North Korea has long professed to be concerned about an invasion by U.S. and South Korean forces. Having witnessed in recent years the announcement of a U.S. doctrine of preemption against potential threats to our security, North Korea’s assignment (by President George W. Bush) to the “Axis of Evil,” and Operation Iraqi Freedom, justified on the basis of regime change, the North Korean leadership may well be more concerned than ever about the prospect of U.S. military action.

What options are available to us? Preemption against North Korea’s nuclear facilities would require near-perfect intelligence about the locations of all of those facilities. Who among us would have confidence in such intelligence in the wake of our experience with Iraq? Moreover, consideration of any military action against North Korea must take into account the vulnerability of South Korea’s capital, Seoul, to North Korean artillery and missiles; indeed, Tokyo is also within range of North Korean missiles.

Diplomacy remains the least-bad option for dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem. A strengthened version of the 1994 Agreed Framework would be the most promising outcome — one that calls for a rollback of North Korea’s nuclear-weapons program in return for economic aid, improved diplomatic relations and a nonaggression pledge.

Iran’s nuclear history dates back to the days of the Shah. In the early 1970s, Iran acquired its first nuclear reactor — from the United States. By the time the Shah fell in 1979, Iran had six power reactors under contract, two of which were more than halfway completed. With the change of regime, work on those projects came to a halt. Later, with help from Russia, Iran began to rebuild its nuclear-power program. Pakistan’s assistance accelerated Iran’s uranium-enrichment program — a program that could eventually serve the dual aims of producing low-enriched uranium fuel for power reactors and highly enriched uranium for bombs.

In recent months, negotiations between Iran and three European countries (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) have focused on freezing Iran’s enrichment program in return for economic aid. This effort merits our support, for here, too, diplomacy is the least-bad available option. The Iranian leadership, like North Korea’s, is very much aware of the U.S. doctrine of preemption, of Iran’s assignment to the “Axis of Evil” and of America’s demonstrated willingness to use military force to accomplish regime change. A deal that meets our needs, and theirs, probably can be struck.

As for Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, the most effective means for preventing their acquisition of nuclear weapons is to secure the nuclear weapons, nuclear materials and nuclear expertise in Russia, other former states of the Soviet Union and elsewhere, and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons-related technologies to additional countries, especially countries that might give or sell them to terrorist organizations.

Difficult as it may appear to be, stemming the spread of nuclear weapons is a challenge far less formidable than would be that of dealing with a world of scores of nuclear powers, possibly including one or more terrorist organizations. In the nuclear world, as in many others, an old adage applies: An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.

Chancellor Albert Carnesale has represented the United States in high-level negotiations on defense and energy issues, including SALT I with the Soviet Union. He holds a Ph.D. in nuclear engineering, is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.